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There has been much recent interest in the problem of fina.ncia.1 
instability in the macro economy.  Some  researchers have looked for cyclical 
and secular co-movements between debt accumulaticn.,  financial crises, and 
problems in the real economy. Others have tried tr, rationalize, in formal 
models, the apparent connections between finance, changes in expectations, 
and macro inst%bility. Two different points of view are embodied in t&is 
work.  One,  deriving from the work of Minsky, emphasizes the importance 
of ignorance and psychology.  Firms are seen as financing accu.mulation  on 
the basis of unverifiable expectations, accumula.ting  debt burdens in the 
process.  When the debt burdens are large enough, the economy becomes 
vulnerable to downward revisions of expectations.  Su.ch  revisions reduce 
effective demand and stimulate financial crises. A second view emphasizes a. 
structural determinant of instability -- declining profitability.  Problems 
with profits are viewed as a major cause of debt burdens, and the source of 
potential financial crisis. 
What follows is an attempt to synthesize these two viewpoints in a 
manageable analytical framework.  To set the stage, we begin with a brief 
review of Minsky’s  ideas, which have to this point received the grea&r 
attention.  This is followed by a discussion of the st.ructuralist.  view and some 
of the key supporting empirical evidence. Next a Keynes-Kalecki  model of 
growth with debt is constructed.  It suggests that in economies where debt 
fina.nces  accumula.tion,  stable and unstable configurations of economic 
variables coexist simultaneously.  The proximity of these regions is shown ti 
depend an expectational and distributional factors.  The model therefore introduces a way to characterize financial fragility in terms of stability 
theory, and shows how structuralist and Minskian ideas complement each 
other. 
2.  Recent  Work on Finance  and Macro  Stability 
Minsky ( 1982)  has long worked to develop a theoretica. connection 
between debt and economic  fluctuations.  It is basically Keynesian is spirit. 
He begins by looking at an economy at the end of a large scale depressio’n. 
As a consequence of widely expefienced economic disaster, existing firms 
will accept little debt, will prizs liquidity, and will make cautious estimates 
of the potential profits from investment projects.  Their rates of 
accumulation will therefore be low, they will easily meet their debt 
commitments, and gradually their confidence in the future will rise.  Hence 
they will raise estimates of future profitability, accept lower liquidity and 
higher debt burdens.,  and increase rates of accumulation. This becomes a 
self-reinforcing process which proceeds happily along until some event 
disrupts the financial system.  Minsky suggests that an increase in interest 
fates is the usual culprit.  In an economy where the demand for credit is 
interest inelastic, because of high debt burdens, and where its supply is also 
inelastic, because of policy of endogenous restrictions, the increase sparks a 
crisis. The difficulty firms have in making debt payments causes them the 
revalue the wisdom of investments.  As investment demand declines, so do 
profits, which amplifies the problem. The depth of the decline will depend 
on how indebted firms are and how the goverment reacts.  If the ultimate 
downtu.rn is not ~JDO  severe, it sets the stage for further  expansion of debt 
and larger problems in the future. Now  Minsky’s  account is clearly driven by changes in expectations.  Those 
expectations are presumed to be formed in a Keynesian world,,  that is where 
the future is truly unknown; in which there are no contingent claim market. 
for all enumerable eventualities; and in which actfirs have enough 
experience to know that the future may generate events for which there is 
no current. vocabulary. A neat, partial formulation of the Minsky view has 
bsen prcjvided  by Taylor and O’Connell  ( 1%35).  Using  a linear dynamic 
model, and making expected future profitability dependent on the deviation 
of interest r&s  from some normal value, they are able tfi show that ch&ges 
household liquidity preference -- a proxy fGr  confidence in the economy -- 
can switch the mc:jdel  from a stable tfi an unstable state. 
In the Minsky-inspired strand of analysis,  variability of income shares 
is not considered an important pal-t of the story.  Recent empirical work 
suggests this may be a significant omission. There is a long txadition of ne+ 
Martian research on the cyclical and b-end profit squeeze in the U. S. 
economy (e.g.  Boddy and Crotty, 1475; Weisskopf,,  1979;  Hahnel and 
Sherman, 1982;  Gordon,  Weisskllspf  and Pxwles, 19  6  3). Recently Wolfson 
( 1986~  made a very detailed study of financial crises in the post-war 11.  S. 
economy, using NBER  business cycle dating techniques. He observed 
(Wolfson, 1386, pp. 145-6) a regular relationship bet.ween  changes in the 
profit share and financial crisis: 
In every crisis period, a pxticular  timing relationship has -- witW 
only one exception -- occurred. Peaks ha.ve  been reached in profit. and 
investment variables for the nonfinancial corporate sector, in relation 
to the financial crisis, in the following order:  C  1)  the profit [share], i2> 
new ox&acts  and orders for plant and equipment (in constant dollars), (3) investment and plant and equipment (in constant doltars), 
(4) the financial crisis and (5) the financing gap [that is, the difference 
between capital expenditures and internal funds]. (materials in 
brackets added) 
He concludes: 
.  .  . t-&e  financing gap increased in periods immediately preceding 
financial crises not only because investment spending increased, But 1 
also because internal funds declined. The failure of internal funds to 
ma.intain  their rate of growtA,  in fact their tendency to decline, 
resulted in an increasing financing gap...a  decline in profits occurring 
near the peak of We expansion generally has been responsible for this 
decrease in inbrnal  fundsAt was the decline in profits that resulted 
in the corporations having difficulty in meeting their fixed payment 
committ&Ients  -- due TV  involuntary plant and equipment investment 
as well as debt. 
Robert Pollin has looked at competing hypotheses which explain the 
rising corporate debt in the post-war period.  He concludes ( 1986, p.22  7) 
that the increase is a function of declining profitability and competitive 
pressure: 
The overall results of the econometric test and other statistical 
evidence point to one central conclusion: the trend decline in the 
corporate profit level and rate over phase two, 1967-80, provides the primary e,xplanation  for the rise of corpora& debt dependency over 
that period...With  internal funds down, corporations were forced tfi 
borrow tr, an increasing extent in order to maintain a competitive 
level of spending and support their markets through trade credit 
extensions. 
The model developed in the subsequent section incofporates ideas fr6m 
Minsky and from thi:tSe  Who  emphasize profitability.  It Will  be ?I.sed  ti  sh0W 
why an economy with debt can have stable and unstable regions, and hbw 
changes in expectational and structjJ.ral  factfirs may iaffect  the proximit))  of 
those regions. 
_ 3_ A Model of Accumulation  with  Debt 
To keep life simple, we will begin witA  a closed economy in which 
aggregate demand.,  composed of investment and consumption, dekrmines 
the rate of output.  Goods  markets ~411  be assumed to clear immediat&ly,  and 
money prices will be assumed fixed. To det..rmine flows of output we need 
an investment function. This is always a difficulty for anyone const.ructing  a 
Keynesian-Kaleckian  macro model.  If the world is rea.lly cha.racterized  by 
ungrounded expectation  s, how does one represent accumula.~ton  as a. 
function?  Perhaps the best we can do is su.ggest  that lcng term expectXii>ns 
are given, but within the constraint of those expect-ations,  scme functional 
relationships obtain  One common sense rela.tionship  might be that capacity 
u.t.ilization  below a minimally acceptable level will exert downwa.rd  pressure 
on accumulation. Unless there is investment in innovative processes, t.here will be no need to add to spare capacity. Another sensible step iS to carry 
over some of the insights of Kalecki,  which have reappeared in the so-called 
“New  Keynesian”  li&ratu.re on fina.nce  constiaints and accumulation (e.g. 
Fazzari et a.l., NM).  One begins with the not too startling assumption that 
capital markets are not perfect.  Lenders have difficulty evaluating 
investment projecti, and have agent problems in monitoring and assessing 
outcomes. Hence firms may be forced t’ wait for self -finance tc~  support 
viable projects, and lenders may use cash-flow or indebtedness measures to 
evalu.ate suitability of borrowers.  Also, as Kalecki  suggests, fifms may ‘knave 
definite aversion tx bankruptcy risk, and thus restrict their use of finance a.s 
cash-flow declines or debt rises.  Hence,  even when the Cheshire cat smile of 
capitalists’ expectations is hanging firmly in place, variations in debt or cash- 
flow will alter the rate of accumulation.  This view will be represented  by 
writing the desired rate of capital accumulation,  gd, as 
where I’ is real output, K is real capital st.ock,  n is the flow of profits divided 
by the capital stock, r is the rate of interest, and d is the ratio of firm debt to 
capital stock. This functional form is self-explanatory, will the exception of 
the differing parameters (3  and v. This allows positive cash flows IX  have a 
negative effect on desired accumulation, which makes sense if dividends are 
to be paid to stockholders and principal is to be retired.  A larger relative 
value of v would indicate a more cautious mood on the part of capitalists. 
Since  there are acknowledged lags between order and construction in the 
capital good  s sector, we will assume that the rate of accumulatWn,  g = F;/K, 
moves according  to will be no need to add to spare capacity. Another sensible step is tc carry 
over some of the insights of Kalecki,  which have reappeared in the so-called 
“New  Keynesian”  literature  on finance constraints and accumulation (e.g. 
Fazzari et al., l%S>. One  begins with the not too startling assumption that 
capital markets are not perfect.  Lenders have difficulty evaluating 
investment projects, and have agent problems in monitoring and assessing 
out_omes. Hence firms may be forced ti  wait for self-finance to support 
viable projects, and lenders rnay use cash-flow or indebtedness measures to 
evaluate suitability of borrowers.  Also,  as Kalecki  suggests, firms may have 
definite aversion to bankruptcy risk, and thus restrict their use of finance as 
cash-flow declines or debt rises.  Hence,  even when the Cheshire  cat srnile of 
capitalists’ expectations is hanging firmly in place, va.riations  in debt or cash- 
flow will alter the rate of accumulation.  This view will be represented by 
writing the desired rate of capital accumulation,  gd, as 
gd  = a(Y,X - c) + J3n  - ‘urd  K,  c, ~3,  y > 0  ,  ~3  13 
where Y  is real output, K is real capital stock, p is the flow of profits divided 
by the capital stock, r is the rate of inter-est,  and d is the ratio of firm debt to 
capital stock. This funCtiOna  form is self-explanatory, will the eXceptiOn  of 
the differing parameters  p and y. This allows positive cash flows to have a 
negative effect on desired accumulation,  which makes sense if dividends are 
to be paid to stockholders and principal is to be retired.  A larger relative 
value of B  would indicate a rnore cautious rnood on the part of capitalists. 
Since  there are acknowledged lags between order and construction in the 
capital goods sector, we will assume that the rate of accumulation, g = i/K, 
moves according to k =h(gd-g  -,-,gz),  ~xbO,rpO  (21 
This is a standard part%.1  adjustment model with one innovation. The Mm 
in g2 is added to fepJre%?nt  an upper limit to the rate of growth. Even if gd -g 
is large and positive, i will be limit&d  by the current va.lue  of g. Given this 
relationship, we ne-xt  turn our attention to the det&rmination  of the debt 
burden in this economy. It will be assumed that borrowing Qkes place only 
to finance capital accumulation or make interest. pa.yments  which ca.nnM  be, 
cOVered  by ret&ed  eXliingS.  Thus  we  IiaW  t.he  relationship 
b=rDtI-Bn  (3) 
where D  is the real value of debt, I is investment,  1 >  8 x  o is the corporat& 
retention ratio, and l-I  is the real value of profits.  If corporate retained 
earning always exceed investment eqJenbitures,  there will be no debt. 
Defining  d= D/K,  we have the identity 
b =  D/K  - dg  (4) 
and substitution of (3) inti  (41  gives 
2 = rd + 8n - g - dg 
The dynamical system given by (2  1 and (5) is tAe one which will be used 
to analyze the ideas on finance and stability which were discussed in %he 
previous section. This will be done in a series of cases, which make different assumptions about income distribution, aggregate demand, and the 
determination of the interest rate. 
Case 1:  Keynesian  savings, interest  rate and income shares fixed. 
As  a.  first case consider an economy in which savings is proportional to 
income, and in which la.bor’s  share of income is taken to be determined 
exOgeno?lsly  by the relative power of workers and capitalists.  Then capacity 
utilization is given by  . 
< 
where s is the constant savings propensity.  The rate of profit is 
n=(l  -w)g/s  (7) 
where w  is labor’s share.  The rate of interest will be taken as fixed. Now 
this assumption may not be as strong as it seems.  Unless one believes tha.t 
the central bank can drive the long term rate of in&rest to zero, which 
would imply unlimited funds for every borrower and a very lenient 
capitalist system indeed, then it is likely that there is minimum rate of 
interest on debt used to finance accumulation. So long as there is, the 
following argument will go through.  Expressions (6) and (7) can be 
substitued into (2  ) and (5) to-  obtain the corresponding dynamical system. 
Assuming Q  = [(CC  + p( 1 - CO))&]  - 1 > 0,  which is necessary for g ever ~JD  be 
positive, and v = 1  -  [8(  1  -  d/s]  > 0,  which is necessary to explain the 
existence of debt, we can write the dynamical system as h =  rd + vg - dg 
where coefficients are implicitly redefined to account for the value of h. The 
dynamics of (6) can be represented by the phase diagram given in Figure 1. 
Assuming that (8) has two solutions, they will correspond to critical points A 
. 
and B in the diagram. 
\ 
The motion around these pointz is indicatid in Figure 2, which ca.n  be 
derived from consideration of the vectors of motion given in Figure 1. 
Clearly point A, with a lower rate of growth and higher debt capital ratio, is 
locally a saddle point; while I3  is locally stable.1 Their juxtaposition suggests 
the following intuitions about this model economy. Near point B, the 
economy will respond to small enough shocks by oscillating about point B. 
This might be taken to represent non-explosive business cycle behavior. 
Larger shocks, however, might move the economy so far to the northwest 
that it would begin to experience self -amplifying difficulties. Growth rates 
would decline and debt burdens would increase. That is, a financial crisis 
would develop. 
Consider  now the effects of a change in the distribution of income. An 
increase in labor’s share would decrease profitability at every rat&  of 
accumulation,  thus shifing the i  = 0 isocline downward.  Similarly, the 
decline in profitability would shift t&e  ‘d  = 0 isocline upward, reflecting the 
fact that for any rate of accumulation, more external finance would be 
required.  The net effect of these changes, iiiustuated in Figure 3, is to move 
the stable point and the equilibrium point_ closer together.  A shock which previously generated local QscillatiQns  around the stable point is now capable 
of causing a financial crisis. Thus declining profitability makes the ecQnQmy, 
in a measurable way, mQre  fragile. 
It is alsQ  pQssible  to ey;amine  how cha.nges  in the attitudes of capitalist 
and in financial market conditions affect the fragility of this economy. An 
det&riQratiQn  in long period c3p?Ct&iQnS  might be represented by a decrease 
in the cQefficient.  CC.  This WQUid  shift the b = 0 ~QCUS downward, moving the 
eqilibria clcrser  tclgether and increasing fragility.  An increase in the interest 
rat&  would shift the i  = 0 locus upward, while shifting the & = 0 locus  t I 
\ 
downward. This WQuld  alsa increase fragility  Shifts of these sclrts WQuld 
represent the kind Qf  changes suggest&d  by Minsky. HQWeVer,  the mQde1 
suggests that ffagility exists without.  the shifts, and that changes in 
prQfitabilty can induce greater fragility withQut  changes in expect&iQns  or 
changes in financial market cQnditiQns. 
Case 2:  Keynesian savings,  income shares  fixed,  interest  fate 
variable. 
NQW  it is reasonable to consider in mQre  detail whether the cQexist.nce Qf 
stable and unstable regimes depends on the fixed interest rate assumption 
Qr  on ignoring the ability of gQvernrnent  expenditure to keep ca.paCity 
utlilization at sQme  non-negative level.  Clearly the ability of government to 
maintain aggregate demand is not, by itself, suffcient to eliminate instability. 
TQ  see this, let us assume tha.t the government tax-finances an expenditure 
prQpQrtiQna.1  to the capital stock of t.  Then Y/K = t t g/s and the d intercept 
of i  = 0 isocline is a positive value.  HQWeVer,  this dQeS  not change the qualit&ve  dynamics of the economy. Then what about a variable interest, 
ra.te,  together with aggregate dema.nd  help from the government?  To ma.ke 
the rate of interest responsive to levels of demand, write a Keynesian 
market clearing function for an exqenously  given stock of money, M, as 
This assumes an interest. sensitive transactions demand for money only. If 
centWa1  S>ank  policy is represented by M =  mK,  m > 0,  t&e  bank can dri+  the 
in&rest rate up or down depending on how m changes. Then (9) can be 
rewritten 8s 
In t&is  ca.se,  unless m is infin&, a somewhat unlikely ba.nk  policy, the ra%e 
of interest is not Zer6. Substitution of ( 1  ct  j intO (8  j will leave the dynamics 
UliCfi~llgHi. 
Case 3:  Classical  savings,  income  shares  variable,  interest  fate 
fixed. 
As a final exercise with this model, let us consider the classical case, 
where workers do not save, while ca.pitalisQ  &I. If we choose to interpret 
this in a Ka.leckian  fashion, Y/K =  g/C  1 -wj, and the rate of profit is equal to 
the rate of accumulation. Here there is no possible impact of income shares 
on We rati2  of borrowing. If some profits are distributed by corporat.ions  and capitalist households consume some part of diS&ibUted  earnings, the 
proportion of investment which will be financed is 1 - a/(( i-c)+c6)  )  0  , 
where  1  > c  > 0  is capitalist propensity to consu.me  from distributed profits 
However, an increase in the wage share increases utilization rates,  shifting 
the i  = 0 locus upward. This would make t1ie  System less fragile. 
Since  the elementary Kaleckian model does not accord with the behavior 
of profit rates Over  the business cycle, we need something slightly more 
complex.  Let us assume that possible rates of profit vary with the rate of 
capxity  utilization according to  . 
\ 
This may be taken to reflect decreasing productivity as employment rates 
increase along with capacity utilization.  A relationship such as this is 
suggest&d  in the work c>f  Gordon  et al ( 1  M3).  Let us also assume that , at a 
given level of accumulation,  aggregate demand will be related to profita.bility 
according to 
Y/K  =  cg  -  Dn  C,bO  WI 
This reflects the fact that workers do not save while capitalists do. These 
two relationships are represented  in Figure 4. It is clear from this figu.re 
that capacity utilization will increase with accumu.lation,  but the profit rate 
will increase and then decrease.  Hence ( 11)  and ( 12  > can be resM+d as and 
Y/K = J.Qg  , y.3  >  Q  (l-4) 
Substituticrn  of ( 1.3)  and ( 14)  into (2) and (5) then gives us a dynamical 
system of the form 
b =  rd + B(~i.~g  - ~.~g2)  - g - dg 
This system is represented in the phase diagram of Figure 5 under the 
assu.mptiion  that  ( 1  -  Eljkl>  j  0.  In this case, there are now stable and unstable 
points  (If the &rm in bracket3 is less t&an  zero there will be only an 
unstable point.)  In this system,  changes in exI>ectWU-ial  factors have the 
same effects on the proximity of U-e  stable and u.nstAble  pointz 3.5  in 6%. 
And a decrease in the potential profits at any rate of capacity utilizat&Xi,, 
With  would be representted by an decrease in the parameter  kq,  will shift 
the i  = 0 locus down and the ‘d  = 0 locus up, thereby making this system 
more fragile.  Thus changes in potential profits have the same effects in all 
three systems. 
4  _ Conclusion 
The model developed in the previous section provides a tractable 
framework for examining the connection of debt to macroeconomic  stability. 
It shows that, under a va.riety of assu.mptions  common tB the Keynes-Kale&i tradition, an economy will have both stable and unstable regions. For some 
combinations of growth rate and debt burden, an economy will be stable. 
Shocks  of a reasonable size may cause oscillations,  but the economy will tend 
toward acceptable values.  For other growth rate-debt  burden combinations 
--  generally for lower growth rates and higher debt burdens -- the system 
will be unstable.  The closer these regions, the more vulnerable is the system 
to shocks which move it away from the locally stable region. 
The model therefore has the virtue of providing a definition of financial 
fragility in terms of stability theory.  The closer the stable and unstable 
basins, the more financially fragile is t&e  system.  Moreover, since proximity 
is determined by expectational, distributional, a.nd  inter-est rate factors, the 
model argues for a multivariate analysis of the causes of any financial crisis. 
Finally, since some of the implications of the model are quite unambiguous, it 
is gives potentially falsifiable form to some of the ideas in the financial 
stability literature. FootnotRs 
1. While the stability  properties  can be deduced  from the  phase  diagram, 
they  can be easily established  algebraically  in a particular  case.  Note that 
for the  dynamical system  (6), which has a i  = 0 isocline given  by d = ($ - qg2 
- c)/pr, the slope of the ‘g  = 0 isocline is given by I$  - 2qg. To the  left of g*= 
$/Zq  the slope is positive, and to the right  it is negative.  Note also that  d  > v 
when2  = 0.  Now the stability  of a fixed point like A or I3  can be deriv?d 
from the Jacobian matrix 
evaluated  at the fixed point  (Arrowsmith  and Place, pp. 85-6).  When Det(Jj > 
0 and  Tr(Jj  < 0,  the  point is stable.  When Bet(J) < 0,  it is a saddle.  Taking the 
derivatives  of (8) gives the  Jacobian 
J = 
v-d  r-g 
Now D&(J) = (4 - 2vg)(r - g) + /3r(v-d) = (4 - zqg>(r - g> + prv( 1-g/(g-r>j. 
Therefore  Det(J) > 0  if  (I$  - zqg)(r - g)g - przd > 0.  Substitution  shows that. 
this inequality  is equivalent  to 2qg3 + rc - qrg2 - 4g2 > 0.  Since by 
assumption  g ) r, this can be reduced  to g2(2qg - qr - 4) + rc )  0.  This will be 
satisfied  if g >  ((I$  + qrj/2$.  In the  case where  c = 0, (8) can be solved for g to give an equilibrium  value  of g = {-(@+y) + [($+r)r)2  - 4qr(4 + v@11,2}/-27. If 
g is to have  two solutions, then  it will be the  case that  the  larger  equilibrium 
value  of g will be greater  than  (4 + qr )/a?.  The smaller  value  of g will be less 
than  this value.  Hence A will be a saddle  point, while B will be a stable 
point.  For cases in which t # 0, direct  solutions  for g require  solving a cubic 
equa.t.ion. Hence we are cont&nt with  the qualitative  analysis  of the  phase 
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